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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case comes before this Court on an appeal from an
Order of Formal Determination of Heirs, with respect to the
constitutionality
specific

of an applicable Utah

statutory

authority

state

confirming

statute.

jurisdiction

The

on this

Court is Utah Code Annotated S78-2-2(3)(i).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED

I
Does
Article

IV,

Utah

Code

Section

Annotated

S75-2-109(1)(b)(ii)

1 of the Utah

Constitution by

violate
allowing

mothers but not properly adjudicated fathers to inherit through
their deceased child?
II
Does Utah Code Annotated S75-2-109(1)(b)(ii) violate the
Equal Protection clause of the XlVth Amendment to the United
States Constitution by discriminating

against

fathers on the

basis of gender?
Ill
Does Utah Code Annotated S75-2-109(1)(b)(ii) violate the
Due

Process

clause

of XlVth Amendment

to the United

States

Constitution by allowing a mother, but not a father, to inherit
through their child solely on the basis of gender?
IV
Does Utah Code Annotated S75-2-109(1)(b)(ii) fail to meet
the requirements of the Due Process clause of the XlVth Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution

because

it

is

unconstitutionally vague?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah

Code Annotated

S75-2-109.

Meaning

of child and

related terms.
1. If for purposes of intestate succession, a
relationship of parent and child must be
established to determine by, through or from a
person:
a.
An adopted person is the child of an
adopting parent and not of the natural or
previously adopting parents, except that adoption
of a child by the spouse of a natural or
previously adopting parent has no effect on the
relationship of the child and that natural or
previously adopting parent.
b. In cases not covered by sub-section 1(a),
a person born out of wedlock is the child of the
mother.
That person is also the child of the
father if:
i. The natural parents participated in
a marriage ceremony before or after the birth
of the child, even though the attempted
marriage is void, or
ii.
The paternity is established by an
adjudication before the death of the father,
or is established thereafter by clear and
convincing proof, except that the paternity
established under this sub-section 1(b)(ii)
is ineffective to qualify the father or his
kindred to inherit through or from the child
unless the father has openly treated the
child as his and has not refused to support
the child.
Constitution of Utah, Article IV Section 1.
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote
and hold office shall not be denied or abridged on account
of sex. Both male and female citizens of the state shall
enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights
and privileges.
y

Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of
the United States and of the state wherein they reside.
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunity of citizens of the United
States nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of
the laws.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

action

was

originally

brought

by

Respondent

declare Appellant ineligible to inherit from his son.

to

It was

brought in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, in
the State of Utah, before the Honorable David E. Roth, District
Court

Judge.

Annotated,
inherit

That

Court

held

that, pursuant

875-2-109(1)(b)(ii), Appellant

through

his

deceased

child.

was

The

to Utah

Code

ineligible

Court

found

to
that

although Appellant had been properly adjudicated to be the father
of the child, and had not refused to support the child, he had
failed to treat the child openly as his own.

The Court also

held that Section 75-2-109(1)(b)(ii) was constitutional and did
not violate Article IV, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution, or
the

Equal

Protection

and

Due

Process

clauses

Amendment of the United States Constitution.
the finding of constitutionality
court and
vague.

also that

said

of the

XlVth

Appellant appeals

of the statute by the trial

statute was not

unconstitutionally

(See Appellant's Docketing Statement at 1, In the Matter

of the Estate of William "Billy Joe11 Scheller (No. 880116)), Case
No. 880116, pages 1-4).
4

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant,

Michael

Pessetto,

and

Respondent,

Jolene

Scheller, were the parents of the decedent, William "Billy Joe"
Scheller.

The decedent was born out of wedlock on or about

August 10, 1981.
At the time of the decedent's birth, the decedent was
deprived

of

oxygen

for a

significant period

of time, which

resulted in a condition of cerebral palsy with resultant spastic
quadriplegia.

The resulting condition permanently impaired the

decedent throughout his life and ultimately caused his death.
Thereafter, the Respondent and the State of Utah filed an
action to determine paternity in the Second District Court in
Weber County.
matter,

On or about May 24, 1983, after a trial on the

Appellant

decedent.

was

adjudicated

to

be

the

father

of

the

In 1983, Respondent filed- an action for professional

malpractice against St. Benedict's Hospital and three physicians.
In December of 1986, the action was settled without trial.

Said

settlement resulted in significant amounts of funds being placed
in an irrevocable trust and other funds to be paid on a periodic
basis.
On or about August 14, 1986, the decedent died in Ogden,
Utah at about the age of 5 years.

On or about December 1, 1986,

Respondent filed a Petition for Formal Determination of Heirs.
Said Petition sought to declare Appellant ineligible to inherit
from his son, the decedent, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 8752-109(1)(b)(ii) (hereinafter referred to as the subject statute).
5

The Court

subsequently

ruled

that Appellant could not

inherit through his deceased son due to his failure to meet the
requirement of openly treating the child as his own under the
subject statute.

Appellant then appealed the constitutionality

of this statute.

(See Appellant's Docketing Statement, at 2, in

the Matter of the Estate of William "Billy Joe" Scheller (No
880116).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Section
discriminates

75-2-109(1) (b) (ii)
against

fathers

of

Utah

Code

Annotated

on the basis of gender.

The

statute allows mothers but not properly adjudicated fathers to
inherit through their deceased child.

A mother is allowed to

inherit through the child simply by being the mother, but the
father of a child must meet two additional requirements imposed
by

the

statute

once

paternity

has

been

adjudicated.

This

discrimination violates not only the Utah Constitution but also
the XIV Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The statute is discriminatory on its face and violative of
the Utah Constitution in that it does not allow "both male and
female

citizens

of

this

state

to

enjoy

equally

political and religious rights and privileges".

all civil,

Several other

states with constitutional clauses similar to Utah's have struck
down statutes which, like this statute, are discriminatory on the
basis of gender.
The

statute

Constitution

of

also violates

the

United

the XlVth Amendment

States
6

due

to

its

of the

gender-based

discrimination.

This

discrimination

fails

to

pass

the

intermediate level of scrutiny which is applied by the Courts.
The statute on this basis should therefore fail.
Finally, the statute violates the Due Process clause of
the XlVth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

In its

present form the statute deprives fathers, but not mothers, even
though both have been determined to be the proper parents of the
child,

of

their

right

of

inheritance

through

their

child.

Further, the requirement that fathers openly treat the children
as their own, is unconstitutionally vague and also fails to meet
the requirements of the Due Process clause.
For

these

reasons

the

Court

should

unconstitutional portions of the statute.

strike

out

the

This would allow both

mothers and fathers, who stand on equal footing once paternity of
the

father

has

been

established,

to

inherit

through

their

deceased children.
ARGUMENT
I.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 75-2-109 (L) (B) (II) VIOLATES
ARTICLE IV, SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY ALLOWING
MOTHERS BUT NOT "PROPERLY ADJUDICATED" FATHERS TO INHERIT THROUGH
THEIR DECEASED CHILD.
Article
provides:
enjoy

IV,

Section

1

of

the

Utah

State

Constitution

"Both male and female citizens of this State shall

equally

privileges."

all

civil, political

The

purpose

of

and

the

religious

section

is

rights and
to

abolish

discrimination even where it appears appealing and benign and
that all consitutional rights are jeopardized if discrimination
is

permitted.

Beehive

Medical
7

Electronics

v.

Industrial

Commission, 538 P.2d 53 (Utah 1978).
P. 2d 590
approval

In Stoker v. Stoker, 616

(Utah 1980), Article IV, Section
by

the

Court

to

invalidate

an

1 was cited with
interspousal

tort

prohibition. In an important decision, [Pusey v. Pusey], 728 P.2d
117 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court recently rejected gender-based
discrimination in an award of child custody basing its decision
on Article IV, Section 1.

These cases demonstrate that the

Supreme Court has been willing to use Article IV, Section 1 to
strike down statutes which are discriminatory.
A.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED S75-2-109(1)(B)(II) IS
DISCRIMINATORY BY GENDER ON ITS FACE.

The subject statute is on its face discriminatory on the
basis of gender.

The statute allows a mother to unconditionally

inherit through her child while precluding inheritance by a man
properly adjudicated as the child's true father.

The relevant

portion of the statute reads as follows:
...the paternity established under this sub-section,
(1)(b)(ii), is ineffective to qualify the father or his
kindred to inherit from or through the child unless the
father has openly treated the child as his and has not
refused to support the child.
(Utah Code Annotated 875-2109(b)(ii))
In other words, once a father has properly been adjudicated
as a parent, he must meet two further requirements in order to
inherit through his child.

He must (1) openly treat the child as

his and (2) not refuse to support the child.
other hand, must only be the mother.

A mother, on the

She need not meet any

further requirements in order to inherit through her deceased
child.
8

The
imposed

additional
upon

requirements

fathers,

and

discriminatory on its face.

of

not

Paragraph

mothers.

(ii)

It

is

are

only

therefore

This discrimination becomes very

clear when we place the mother in the shoes of the father.

By

simply being the mother, she is allowed to inherit through her
children.

She is not required as is the father to show that she

has openly treated the child as her own and that she has not
refused to support the child.

The result being that if both the

mother and the father were to abandon a child immediately after
birth, the mother could recover automatically, yet the father
could not.

The only basis for making this distinction is that of

gender.
B.

THE SUBJECT STATUTE'S GENDER DISCRIMINATION IS
VIOLATIVE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

Such discrimination might be reasonable before paternity is
established, but not after.

Maternity is a natural process and

is established from the moment of conception, which is not true
with the legal paternity of the father.

However, once paternity

is established, the mother and father become similarly situated.
Both are parents of the child, and as such should be treated
equally and not discriminated against by gender.
This concept was well illustrated in the case of Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979) where the U. S. Supreme Court
upheld a statute which would not allow the father of a child to
bring

a

wrongful

established.
illegitimate

The

death
Court

children

action
said

are

until

that

not
9

paternity

mothers

similarly

and

had

been

fathers

situated.

of
The

controlling factor in Parham was the fact that the father had not
become the legitimate father of the child.
Appellant's situation is much different in that he has been
"properly adjudicated" to be the father of the child.
was

established

Appellant

and

and

the

Respondent

child

was

legitimized.

have

became

similarly

Paternity
Therefore,

situated

and

should be treated equally.
In the case of Laird v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) which is
relied upon by the Respondent, the Supreme Court upheld a statute
which would not allow the father of a child being adopted to have
a role in the adoption decisions, unless or until paternity had
been found.

The father in Laird had not established paternity

and therefore was denied a right in the adoption process.
In a Utah case, Ellis v. Social Services Department of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah
1980) the Utah Supreme Court upheld a paternity requirement which
required an unmarried father to file a claim of paternity within
a certain

period

of time or lose the

adoption of his child.

right to prevent the

Both cases support Appellant's position

that a statute can discriminate on the basis of paternity, but
once paternity is established, the mother and father stand on
equal ground and no discrimination is allowable.
The discrimination against Appellant in the case at bar is
clear.
still

He has properly been adjudicated as the father, yet he
is

not

allowed

to

inherit

through

his

child.

The

Respondent, on the other hand, as the child's other parent, need
10

do nothing in order to inherit through her deceased child. It is
therefore clear that under the subject statute "Both male and
female citizens of this state ..." do not "... enjoy equally all
civil, political and religious rights and privileges."

(Ut.

Const. Art. IV SI).
PROVISIONS IN OTHER STATES1 CONSTITUTIONS SIMILAR TO
ARTICLE IV, SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, HAVE
BEEN USED TO INVALIDATE GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATORY
LEGISLATION.

C.

Several other states have provisions in their constitutions
which, like Utah, provide for equal enjoyment of rights by both
men and women.

No other state has specifically addressed the

statute in question, but many similar statutes have been held to
be

unconstitutional

for

the reason that they

provide

for a

gender-based discrimination.
For example, a state statute permitting only the mother of
an illegitimate child to consent to adoption and not the father
was held to violate the state constitution.
360 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1976).

Adoption of Walker,

Also, statutes which use gender-based

distinctions of the property rights of husbands and wives have
uniformly been held to be in violation of state constitutional
provisions.

Bell v. Bell, 379 A.2d 419 (Md. 1977); DeFlorido v.

DeFlorido, 331 A.2d, 174

(Pa. 1975); Forbes v. U. S., 472 F.

Supp.

1979) .

840

(D. C. Mass.

Further,

it has been well

established that state constitutional provisions require burdens
of child support to be borne by both parents and not just by
fathers.

Kemp v. Kemp, 411 A.2d 1028

(Md. 1980); Silvia v.

Silvia, 400, N.E.2d 1330 (Mass. 1980); Conway v. Dana, 318, A.2d,
11

324 (Pa. 1974); Friedman v. Friedman, 521 SW.2d 111 (Tx. 1975).
Similarly, laws which create gender-based distinctions in
alimony awards have been held to violate state constitutions.
Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60 (Pa. 1974); Smith v. Smith,
382 So.2d 972 (La. 1980); Kenner v. Morris, 600 F.2d 22 (Tenn.
1979) .
As in Pusey, supra., other states which have addressed the
issue of maternal preference in recent years have uniformly held
such statutes to be unconstitutional stating that

a statutory

preference for mothers in child custody issues is a violation of
state constitutional guarantees.

Weber v. Weber, 414 A.2d 682

(Pa. 1979); Irbv v. Dubois, 354 NE 2d 562 (111. 1976).
The Utah Supreme Court and the high courts in several other
states have held that adoptions, property rights, child support,
alimony and child custody legislation must all be gender-neutral.
There is no reason why inheritance should be treated differently.
To limit inheritance by gender should therefore be condemned as a
violation of Article IV Section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
II.
SECTION 75-2-109(1)(B)(II) VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BY
DISCRIMINATING AGAINST FATHERS ON THE BASIS OF GENDER.
The

14th

Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution

provides that "no state shall make or enforce any law which . . .
denies a person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the
laws".

(U.S. Const, amend. XIV, SI)

Over the years the United

States Supreme Court has applied the Equal Protection clause of
the Constitution so as to invalidate discriminatory legislation.
12

A.

EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS, AS DEVELOPED BY THE UNITED
STATES1 SUPREME COURT, REQUIRES THAT UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
S75-2-109(l)(B)(II) PASS AN INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF
SCRUTINY.

The United States Supreme Court has developed a two tiered
analysis of equal protection issues.
analysis.

(1)

Traditional basis of

Under this analysis, the state statute must bear some

rational relationship to the end the state desires to achieve.
Under

this

analysis,

constitutional.

(2)

the

statute

is

presumed

Strict scrutiny analysis.

to

be

If the statute

discriminates against some suspect classification (for example,
race

or

national

origin)

or

where

it

has

an

impact

on a

fundamental right, the state has a very heavy burden to prove
that the classification serves a compelling state interest.

The

statute is presumed to be unconstitutional.
Where a statute is discriminatory on the basis of gender,
(as is the subject statute) the United States Supreme Court has
adopted

an analysis which

scrutiny.
falls.

involves an

intermediate

level of

It is into this category which the subject statute
This

intermediate

level

of

analysis

requires

the

governmental interest to be important and substantially related
to the achievement of the end sought.

In addition, the Supreme

Court has required proof that the end sought to be achieved by
the

statute

distinction.

could

not

be

achieved

with

a

gender-neutral

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) ; Orr v. Orr.

440 U.S. 268 (1979); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Caban
v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 300 (1979); M. Sonoma Co. Super Crt, 450
13

U.S. 455 (1981).
B.

SECTION 75-2-109(1)(B)(II) CANNOT SURVIVE AN
INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY SINCE THE END SOUGHT TO
BE ACHIEVED COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH A GENDER-NEUTRAL
DISTINCTION AND SEVERAL OTHER FEDERAL COURTS HAVE STRUCK
DOWN SIMILAR STATUTES.

In

Orr

supra,

the

Supreme

Court

struck

down

an

alimony

statute as a violation of the equal protection clause, stating
that the purposes of that statute could have been accomplished
with

gender-neutral

classifications

and

it

violation of the Equal Protection clause.

was

therefore

a

In the present case,

the subject statute likewise could accomplish its purposes with a
gender-neutral

classification, that is, the statute could have

been written to disinherit both men and women under the same
circumstances

and

therefore

not

violate

the

equal

protection

clause.
A number of federal courts have struck down state statutes
under

the

Equal

discriminations.
(1)

Protection

clause

for

such

gender-based

The following cases are illustrative:

Kirchberq v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) struck down
a

statute

which

permitted

a

husband

to

dispose

of

jointly held property without the wife's consent, but
did not allow the wife to dispose of property without
her husband's consent;
(2)

Johnston v. Hodges, 372 F.2d
down

a

Kentucky

statute

1015, (Ky. 1974) struck

which

required

a

minor's

driver's license application be signed by a father, but
not a mother;

14

(3)

Bowen v,
struck

Hackett,

down

361

differing

determining

dependant's

statutes.

The

F.

Supp

854

(D.C. R.I. 1973)

gender-based

procedures

allowances under

gender-based

procedures

for

unemployment
violated

the

equal protection clause.
(4)

Wenaler

v.

Druggist

Mutual

Insurance,

446

U.S.

142

(1980), a statute which allowed compensation benefits
to a widow unconditionally, but to a widower only upon
proof of dependency was declared unconstitutional

for

violating equal protection.
The subject statute is similar to all of these cases in that
it places

requirements on the father, but not the mother even

though both are seeking to obtain the same right.
prevent

a

father

from

inheriting

through

It attempts to

his

child

after

paternity has been adjudicated, but does not attempt to prevent
the mother from inheriting through the child.
therefore, that
level

of

such a statute does not pass the

scrutiny

situations.

It should follow,

as

Indeed,

it
the

is

applied
statute

intermediate

by

the

courts

may

not

even

in
pass

such
the

traditional basis of scrutiny since the mother need do nothing to
inherit.

The subject statute should therefore be declared as a

violation of the Equal Protection clause of the XlVth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.
III.
SECTION 75-2-109(1) (B) (II) VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF THE XIVTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BY
ALLOWING A MOTHER, BUT NOT A FATHER, TO INHERIT THROUGH THEIR
CHILD SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF GENDER.
The XlVth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
15

prohibits any "state from making or enforcing any law which ...
deprives any person of ... due process of law ...".
amend. XIV, SI)

(U.S. Const,

The United States Supreme Court has, as a

violation of the Due Process clause, invalidated statutes and
procedures which provide financial benefit in a discriminatory
way based upon sex or gender.
In Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), the Supreme
Court struck down a social security law which permitted all
widows to get survival benefits, but widowers were not allowed to
get benefits unless they could show dependency.
struck down
Weinberger

as a violation
v.

Wissenfeld,

The practice was

of the Due Process clause.
420

U.S.

636

(1975),

the

In

social

security law which provided benefits to mothers with children and
deceased husbands, but not the same for fathers with children was
struck down as violating the Due Process clause.

Similarly,

Calif ano v. Webster, 440 U.S. 313 (1977) struck down a social
security law which provided greater benefits for women reaching
62 then for men.

This was termed a "Due Process violation".

Finally, Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) held that aid to
families with unemployed

fathers, but not unemployed mothers

violated the due process clause of the federal Constitution.
The subject statute, if held constitutional, would allow a
mother, but not a father, to receive financial benefits through
her

childfs

inheritance.

The

mother

and

the

father

are

indistinguishable after paternity has been established, as in the
present case,

yet the father would be denied his right to
16

financial benefits from his child's inheritance.

The Respondent

will be allowed to inherit through her child while the Appellant
will not, even though both are similarly situated.

This is a

violation

be

of

Due

Process

and

as

such,

should

found

unconstitutional.
IV. SECTION 75-2-109(1)(B)(II) IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND
THEREFORE FAILS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE XIV AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES.
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court held that "A law
forbidding or requiring conduct in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to

its application, violates due process of law".

Baqcrett v. Bullett, 377 U.S. 360 at 367, (1964), (citing Conlev
v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385).

The Utah Supreme

Court in 1981 ruled:
The United States Supreme Court has stated:
It is established that a law fails to meet the
requirements of the due process clause if it is so
vague and standardless that it leaves the public
uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves
judges and jurors free to decide without any
legally fixed standards what is prohibited and
what is not in each particular case."
In re:
Bover. 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981).
In addition, the high courts of other states have declared
statutes

void

and

unconstitutional

due

to

their

vagueness.

L.D.S., Inc., v. Healy, 589 P.2d 490 (Colo. 1979) and State in
the

interest

therefore

of Hunter,

clear

that

387 So.2d
a

state

unconstitutionally vague.

17

1086
statute

(La. 1980).
can

be

It is
declared

A.

SUBPARAGRAPH
(II) OF 75-2-109(1) (B) IS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE SINCE IT ALLOWS SUBJECTIVE
STANDARDS TO BE USED AND FORCES MEN OF COMMON
INTELLIGENCE TO GUESS AT ITS MEANING.

The Utah Supreme Court, in an explanation about a vague
standard said:

"The breadth and imprecision of that standard

permit the determination ... to be based on factors subjective to
the

trier

of

fact and

factors extraneous

interests of the state".

to the

legitimate

The Court went on further to explain

that language should be unconstitutionally vague when it "...
lends itself to a completely subjective and therefore potentially
arbitrary and nonuniform evaluation of what is decided rather
than an objective evaluation of the method by which the decision
is reached".

In re; Boyer, 636 P.2d at 1088.

In other words, a

statute is unconstitutional "if it is so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning".

In re:

Boyer, 636 P.2d at 1088 and L.D.S. Inc., v. Healy, 589 P.2d at
491.

A statute should allow an objective determination of its

standards.
Sub-paragraph (ii) of the subject statute requires a father
to have "openly treated the child as his own" in addition to "not
refuse to support the child".

The language "openly treated as

his own" is just the type of vague language referred to by the
Courts in the above decisions.
a child as your own?
standard.

What constitutes openly treating

There are several problems with such a

It is clear that everyone would have his own and a

different definition of what "openly treating his child as his
18

own" would mean.

Some would say mere support of a child would

satisfy the requirement, while others would say that nothing
short of living in the same home as the child would satisfy the
requirement.

It becomes clear that such a standard is purely

subjective.
The Colorado Supreme Court in discussing what constitutes a
vague standard described

it as "a concept that brings forth

certain

in the minds

general

feelings

of

all

of

us.

The

parameters of those feelings and reactions, however, vary widely
between individuals11.

L.D.S. Inc. v. Healy, 589 P. 2d at 492.

The subject statute raises different feelings among different
individuals.

The language "openly treated ... as his own" is "so

vague and standardless that it leaves judges

free to decide

without legally fixed criteria when an individual must suffer the
imposition
added).

of

burdens

or

forfeiture

of

rights".

(Emphasis

State in the interest of Hunter, 387 S.3d at 1087.

Under these definitions, the requirement of "openly treating a
child

as

his

own"

is

clearly

a vague

and

unconstitutional

standard.
B.

THE VAGUE LANGUAGE OF S75-2-109 (1) (B) (II) SHOULD BE
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL SINCE IT DEPRIVES APPELLANT
OF HIS RIGHTS TO PROPERTY.

The Utah Supreme Court, along with the Supreme Court of
Colorado

and

the

Supreme

Court

of Louisiana

have held

such

language to be unconstitutional when it deprives one of rights or
property.

Appellant has been deprived of a right to inherit

through his child by such an unconstitutionally vague statute.
19

The subject statute falls squarely within the problems cited by
the

differing

Colorado

courts

Supreme

and

Court

must

said,

fail

for vagueness.

"Due process

requires

As the
that

the

prohibition be explicit enough to allow for meaningful judicial
review", L.D.S., Inc. v. Healy, 589 P.2d at 491.
hardly allows for meaningful judicial review.

This statute

The only standards

which judges may use when seeking to deprive Appellant of his
rights, are completely subjective.

The subject statute should

therefore be declared unconstitutionally vague.
CONCLUSION
Utah Code Annotated S75-2-109(1)(b)(ii) is discriminatory on
its face.

It allows mothers to inherit through their children,

but properly adjudicated
children.

fathers cannot inherit through their

These requirements, (1) open treatment of the child as

his own, and (2) no refusal to support the child, do not even
apply to the mother.

The sole basis for this discrimination is

gender.
Such discrimination by gender violates Article IV, Section 1
of the Utah Constitution.
female

citizens

political

and

of

this

religious

It does not allow "both male and
state
rights

to

enjoy

and

equally

privileges".

all civil,
It

must

necessarily, therefore, be declared unconstitutional.
The subject statute also violates the XlVth Amendment of the
United

States Constitution.

It is a violation of the Equal

Protection clause in that it discriminates on the basis of gender
against fathers who have been properly adjudicated as such, but

20

it does not discriminate against mothers.

Such discrimination

cannot stand up to the intermediate level of scrutiny used by the
Courts to examine state legislation which is discriminatory on
the basis of gender.
substantially

The state cannot show an important and

related purpose

for the achievement of the end

sought and the state could accomplish the same thing with a
gender-neutral statute.
The subject statute also violates the Due Process clause of
the XlVth Amendment.

It deprives a properly adjudicated father

of his right to inherit through his child.

At the same time, the

mother is not deprived but allowed to inherit through her child.
In addition, the requirement that the father "openly treat the
child as his own" is unconstitutionally vague and falls far short
of the requirements of the Due Process clause.
The strength of Appellant's aggument was recognized by
trial court, when it said:

the

It is a pretty good argument and this

is a close case... I wouldn't be devastated if the Su[reme Court
told me I was wrong".

(See Transcript of Proceedings, Case NO.

16434, pags. 17, 19). For these reasons, Appellant requests that
the Court strike the unconstitutional portions of the statute
(Celebrity Inc., v. The Utah Liquor control Commission, 657 P.2d
1243

(Utah 1982)), which results in the same standard being

applied to both mothers and fathers.

This is consistent with the

lower courts' finding that the proper cure to a constitutional
defect is to strike the language from the statute, rather than to

21

add additional language and rewrite the statute, as this is not a
proper judicial function.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^^

ih

day of June, 1988.

RANDALL L.SKEEN
Attorney for Appellant
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Utah Code Annotated 875-2-109
75-2-109. Meaning of child and related terms.
(1)
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship
of parent and child must be established to determined succession
by, through, or from a person:
(a) An adopted person is the child of an adopting parent
and not of the natural or previously-adopting parents except that
adoption of a child by the spouse of a natural or previouslyadopting parent has no effect on the relationship between the
child and that natural or previously-adopting parent.
(b)
In cases not covered by subsection (1)(a), a person
born out of wedlock is a child of the mother.
That person is
also a child of the father, if:
(i) The natural parents participated in a marriage
ceremony before or after the birth of the child, even though the
attempted marriage is void; or
(ii) The paternity is established by an adjudication
before the death of the father or is established thereafter by
clear and convincing proof, except that the paternity established
under this subsection (1)(b)(ii) is ineffective to qualify the
father or his kindred to inherit from or through the child unless
the father has openly treated the child as his and has not
refused to support the child.

Constitution of Utah, Article IX. Section 1
Section 1.
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold
office shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Both
male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all
civil, political and religious rights and privileges.

Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV. Section 1
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of laws.
Transcript of Proceedings at 17, In the Matter of the Estate of
William "Billy Joe" Scheller, Deceased, the District Court of the
Second Judicial District of the State of Utah (No. 16434)

Transcript of Proceedings at 17, In the Matter of the Estate of
William "Billy Joe" Scheller, Deceased, the District Court of the
Second Judicial District of the State of Utah (No. 16434).
1 the statute to make it constitutional.

What it allows

2 the Court to do is to strike the unconstitutional portion
3 of the statute.
4

In this case if you strike the unconstitutional

language from the statute, then you are back to an even

5 handed standard and the laws of intestate succession would
6 apply to our client, as well as to Mr. Kunz' client, because
7 they would both be legal heirs entitled to take under the
8 laws of intestacy.

And certainly the Utah Supreme Court

9 has been clear I think in the liberty to which the Court may
10 take in reforming a statute.

And that is limited to actually]

11 striking the unconstitutional languaae.
12
13

We are prepared to submit it.
THE COURT:

In dealing with your final issue of

14 whether I would be in a position to reform the statute, I
15 tend to agree with you, Mr. Morton, that I wouldn't feel
16 comfortable in rewriting this kind of a statute.

If I could

17 cure the constitutional defect by striking the language from
18 it, that would be the way to do it.

But to add additional

19 lanauage, rev/rite the statute, I don't think would be
20 appropriate.
21

We are left with the issue as to whether the statute,

22 as written, is constitutional.

It is my opinion it could

23

be a much better statute.

24

In my mind it would be better if it required the same burden

25

be placed on both the mother and the father, once the father

There is no question about that.

17

1 had been adjudicated the father.

2

The issue, I suppose, that was faced, or facinq, the

3 Legislators was to set up something to determine who would
4

inherit from an illegitimate child.

Their determination

5 was that the mother would in all cases, and that the father
6 was in a different position, and therefore would have to do
7 something more than what the mother would in order to be
8 able to inherit.

And they have required that he either be

9 adjudicated the father, or establish that fact by clear and
10 convincing evidence.

And beyond that, openly treat the child

11 as his, and not refuse to support the child.
It is the father's argument, as I understand it, that one}:

12

13 he has been adjudicated the father, that he would stand in
14 an equal position with the mother, and from that point on,
15 if

he would have to openly treat the child as his by statute}

16 and not refuse to support the child, it makes sense the same
17 burden be placed on the mother.

It is a pretty good argumentj

18 and this is a close case in my mind.
19

I find the individuals are not similarly situated, in

20 that the mother is biologically determined to be the mother.
21

The father, in order to prove he is entitled to inherit, must

22 do some thinqs. Even though I don't think it is the best
23 statute, I think to either have him prove that he is the father,
24 or be adjudicated, and also openly treat the child as his
25 and not refuse to support is not an unreasonable burden.

18

1

Therefore, I find that the statute is constitutional,

2 although not perfect.

I think it is a close call.

I wouldn'^

3 be devastated if the Supreme Court told me I was wrona.

But

4 that's where I see it.
5

MR. MORTON:

6 matter, your Honor?

Could I just ask a housekeeping
Mr. Kunz has submitted some Proposed

7 Findings and Conclusions, I think, to supplement his original
8 Findings and Conclusions at the January 25th hearinq.

Would

9 it be possible to have five days just to review those under
10 Rule 2.9?
11

THE COURT:

12

MR. KUNZ:

That sounds fair enough.
Well, your Honor, my thinking was to

13 prepare new Findings because the Court said at the beginning
14 of this hearing that hearing is vacated.

And I would prepare

15 new Findings, and recite the fact that Respondent was present
16 in Court, because I had r e c i t e d —
17

MR. MORTON:

We have no objection to that.

We woul<jl

18 prefer that.
19

MR. KUNZ:

So I would prepare new Findings.

Now,

20 as I recall, I believe the Court has said essentially the
21
22

same thing today that they said at that time, except the
Court referred to the Parham case, that he found the Parham

23 case to be persuasive.
24

THE COURT:

I do find it to be persuasive; not

25 directly in point, but persuasive.
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